In Reuben M. Garnett et al., Heirs of Reuben Garnett, Deceased v. Henry Jenkins et al., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a deed from an executor of a will could be used as evidence in court proceedings when it had not been recorded according to state law. The appellants argued that the deed should be admitted into evidence because it was executed by the executor and accepted by all parties involved in the transaction, while appellees argued that since it had not been recorded according to state law, it could not be used as evidence in court proceedings. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that even though there were no technical defects with respect to execution or acceptance of the deed itself, its failure to comply with recording requirements meant that it could not be admitted into evidence and thus must fail on legal grounds.

In Reuben M. Garnett et al., Heirs of Reuben Garnett, Deceased v. Henry Jenkins et al., the dissenting opinion argued that the lower court's decision should be reversed because it was based on an erroneous interpretation of a deed from 1795. The dissent asserted that under Virginia law, when two parties enter into a contract and one party fails to perform their obligations as agreed upon in the contract, then they are liable for damages incurred by the other party due to their breach of contract. In this case, Jenkins had failed to fulfill his obligation under the deed and thus he should have been held responsible for any losses suffered by Garnett’s heirs as a result of his failure to do so. Furthermore, since there was no evidence presented at trial which showed that Jenkins had acted with malice or fraud in failing to comply with his contractual obligations, he could not be held accountable for punitive damages either; therefore reversing judgment would have been appropriate given these circumstances.