Garsed v. Beall et al. was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a county court. The case arose when the plaintiff, Garsed, sought to compel the county court to issue a writ of mandamus to the defendant, Beall, to compel him to pay a debt. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the county court. The Court reasoned that the state court had no jurisdiction over the county court, and that the writ of mandamus was a judicial act that could only be performed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court further held that the state court had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the county court, and that the writ of mandamus was a judicial act that could only be performed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the state court had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the county court, and that the writ of mandamus was a judicial act that could only be performed by a court of competent jurisdiction. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the county court. The Court reasoned that the state court had no jurisdiction over the county court, and that the writ of mandamus was a judicial act that could only be performed by a court of competent jurisdiction. This decision established the precedent that a state court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to a county court.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Garsed v. Beall et al., arguing that the majority's decision was wrongfully based on a misapplication of California law. He argued that under California law, when two or more persons are jointly liable for an obligation, each is individually and severally liable for its full amount. The majority had held otherwise, finding that only one person could be held responsible for the entire debt even though multiple people were listed as joint obligors on a promissory note. Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation of California law and found it to be contrary to established precedent from other states which recognized joint liability among co-obligors regardless of whether they were named together or separately on an instrument such as a promissory note. He further noted that if his interpretation was accepted by the court then creditors would have no incentive to name all parties who are actually obligated since they could still collect from any single party without having to pursue them all at once.