Gaussen v. United States was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a federal court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a state prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Gaussen, was held in a state prison in California and sought a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court. The federal court denied the writ, and Gaussen appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a state prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that was available only to prisoners held in federal custody, and that the federal court did not have the power to interfere with the state's authority to detain prisoners. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that was available only in cases where the prisoner was being held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a state prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that was available only to prisoners held in federal custody, and that the federal court did not have the power to interfere with the state's authority to detain prisoners.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Gaussen v. United States, arguing that a federal statute allowing for the collection of taxes on income from real estate was unconstitutional. He argued that Congress had no authority to impose such a tax under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution which grants Congress power to lay and collect taxes only "for pay[ing] the Debts and provide[ing] for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." The majority opinion held that this clause gave Congress broad powers over taxation, but Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation. He argued instead that it only granted limited powers related to debt repayment and defense spending; any other form of taxation would be an unconstitutional exercise of power by Congress. Furthermore, he noted that if such a broad interpretation were allowed then there would be nothing preventing Congress from imposing direct taxes on citizens without apportionment among states as required by Article I, Section 9 - something which he believed was clearly prohibited by both text and intent within our founding documents.