Gavinzel v. Crump was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, John Gavinzel, was held in a federal prison in the state of Missouri. Gavinzel sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. The Court's decision in Gavinzel v. Crump established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that state courts cannot interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Gavinzel v. Crump, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that under Missouri law, a contract for personal services could not be assigned to another person without the consent of both parties involved in the original agreement. In this case, he asserted that there had been no such assignment or transfer of rights from one party to another; instead, it appeared as though Mr. Crump had simply hired someone else to perform his contractual duties on his behalf while still retaining ownership over those same obligations himself. As such, Justice Field concluded that Mr. Gavinzel did not have any legal right or authority to sue for breach of contract since he was never actually a party to it in the first place and therefore lacked standing before the court.