In Gaylords v. Kelshaw et al., the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a state law which allowed for a creditor to take possession of property belonging to their debtor was unconstitutional. The case involved two creditors, Gaylord and Kelshaw, who had obtained judgments against their debtors in separate cases in Missouri courts. Under Missouri law at the time, if a judgment was not satisfied within one year after it was rendered then the creditor could take possession of any real estate owned by their debtor as payment for what they were owed. In this case however, both Gaylord and Kelshaw attempted to seize land from each other's debtors without first obtaining permission from either court or legislature; thus violating due process rights under Article IV Section 2 Clause 1 (the Full Faith and Credit clause) of the US Constitution which requires states to give full faith and credit towards judicial proceedings issued by another state’s court system. As such, the Supreme Court held that this action violated due process rights under federal law since no permission had been granted prior to taking possession of said property; therefore rendering it unconstitutional according

In Gaylords v. Kelshaw et al., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state statute that allowed for an individual's property to be sold in order to pay off their debts was constitutional. The majority opinion held that it was, but Justice Field dissented on the grounds that such a law violated both due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that since all individuals are entitled to due process under the Constitution, they should not have their property taken away without being given notice or an opportunity to be heard before any action is taken against them. Furthermore, he argued that this law created unequal treatment between debtors and creditors as it gave preferential treatment towards creditors by allowing them immediate access to debtor’s assets while denying debtors any chance at defending themselves from having their property seized without warning or recourse. As such, Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating his belief that this law violated fundamental rights guaranteed by both federal and state constitutions and thus should not be enforced as written