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The U.S. Supreme Court case Alexis Geier, et al. v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., et al., 1999 revolved around the issue of whether federal law preempted state tort claims due to a failure to install airbags in automobiles manufactured in certain years. The plaintiffs argued that they were injured in car accidents because their vehicles did not have airbags and sued under state tort law for damages from the manufacturers and distributors of these cars including American Honda Motor Co.. However, the defendants contended that such lawsuits were barred by Federal Vehicle Safety Standard 208 issued by Department of Transportation (DOT), which allowed auto manufacturers a range of choices among different passive restraint systems during those years rather than mandating only airbags installation. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendants stating that allowing such suits would stand as an obstacle to achieving DOT's objectives i.e., gradual phase-in approach towards passive restraints system like seat belts or air bags etc.
In the dissenting opinion for Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Justice Stevens argued that federal safety standards should not preclude state tort claims unless there is a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so. He contended that the majority misinterpreted the Safety Act's saving clause which preserves common law liability. According to him, this case was about an injured party seeking compensation from a manufacturer who could have avoided injury by installing airbags in its vehicles - something not prohibited by Federal regulations at that time. The fact that manufacturers were given options on how to comply with passive restraint requirements did not mean they were immune from potential lawsuits if their choice resulted in harm, he reasoned. Furthermore, he criticized the majority’s reliance on Department of Transportation interpretations as evidence of Congressional intent when such views weren't expressed until after litigation began and thus lacked persuasive power.