In the General Electric Co. v. Gilbert et al., 1976, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of General Electric (GE), stating that its disability plan excluding pregnancy-related disabilities did not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case was brought forward by a group of female employees who argued that GE's disability plan discriminated against women as it covered all non-job related injuries and illnesses except those related to pregnancy. However, Justice William Rehnquist writing for the majority stated that because only women can become pregnant, any special treatment towards them could be seen as preferential rather than discriminatory. This ruling led to public outcry and eventually resulted in Congress passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act two years later which amended Title VII to explicitly include pregnancy-related conditions within its purview.

In the dissenting opinion for General Electric Co. v. Gilbert et al., Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, argued that the majority's decision was a misinterpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. They contended that GE’s disability plan discriminated on the basis of sex because it excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage while providing benefits for many other types of temporary disabilities. The dissenters believed this constituted unlawful employment practice under Title VII as amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). They also disagreed with majority’s reliance on Geduldig v Aiello case to conclude that discrimination based on pregnancy is not sex-based discrimination; they considered Geduldig irrelevant since it dealt with equal protection clause rather than Title VII which has broader scope against gender bias in workplace settings.