The U.S. Supreme Court case Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Compania de Navegacion Transmar, S.A., Owner of the S.S. Koto (1944) revolved around a dispute over a shipment of lumber that was damaged during transport by sea from Savannah, Georgia to Havana, Cuba in 1939. The shipper sued the carrier for damages under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). However, the carrier argued that it had not been negligent and that an "Act of God" - specifically heavy weather - had caused the damage to cargo which exempted them from liability as per COGSA's provisions. The District Court initially ruled in favor of Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co., but on appeal, this decision was reversed by Circuit Court citing lack of evidence proving negligence on part of carrier or vessel unseaworthiness at time when voyage commenced. In its final ruling though, Supreme Court held that burden is upon shipowner claiming exemption under COGSA to prove cause for loss/damage falls within one or more exceptions listed therein; and if exception relied upon involves allegation like 'Act Of God', then defendant must also show due diligence taken towards making vessel seaworthy before commencement.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Compania de Navegacion Transmar, S.A., argued that the majority's decision to hold the shipowner liable for damages was incorrect because it failed to consider key aspects of maritime law and contract interpretation. The dissent emphasized that under maritime law, a shipowner is not responsible for damage caused by an inherent defect in goods being transported unless they had knowledge of such defects prior to shipment - which was not proven in this case. Furthermore, it contended that the bill of lading should be interpreted as a complete contract between parties involved; thus any stipulations about seaworthiness or cargo safety were irrelevant if they weren't explicitly stated within this document itself. Therefore, according to this view, since there wasn't clear evidence showing either negligence on part of shipowner or their awareness about potential risks associated with lumber transportation at time when agreement was made – liability shouldn’t have been imposed upon them.