Gibson v. Chouteau was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The case arose when the plaintiff, Gibson, sought to compel the defendant, Chouteau, to appear in a state court to answer a complaint. Chouteau argued that the state court lacked the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court reasoned that the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court because the federal court was a court of exclusive jurisdiction. The Court further held that the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court because the federal court was a court of limited jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court because the federal court was a court of limited jurisdiction and the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court held that the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court because the federal court was a court of exclusive jurisdiction and the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court concluded that the state court lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court and the writ of mandamus was denied.

In the case of Gibson v. Chouteau, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's interpretation of the treaty between the United States and certain Indian tribes was incorrect. He believed that it would be unjust to deprive Indians of their rights under this treaty without due process or compensation for any losses they may have suffered as a result. Furthermore, he argued that Congress had not intended to grant such sweeping powers over tribal lands when it ratified this agreement, and thus should not be held responsible for any damages caused by its implementation. Finally, Field asserted that if Congress did intend to take away these rights from Native Americans then it should do so explicitly rather than through an ambiguous interpretation of existing law. In conclusion, Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating that while he respected the majority's decision on this matter, he could not agree with its reasoning or implications for Native American sovereignty and property rights.