Gibson v. Shufeldt was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Gibson, was held in a federal prison in the District of Columbia. Gibson sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which was denied. Gibson then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for prisoners held in state prisons, and that the federal government had its own remedies for prisoners held in federal prisons. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for prisoners held in state prisons, and that the federal government had its own remedies for prisoners held in federal prisons.

In the case of Gibson v. Shufeldt, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was wrongfully based on an interpretation of state law rather than federal law. He believed that the court should have instead applied principles from admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to decide this case. In his view, since it involved a contract between two parties for services rendered at sea, it fell under those principles and therefore should be decided by federal courts rather than state courts as had been done by the majority ruling. Furthermore, he argued that even if there were some ambiguity regarding whether or not admiralty laws applied in this instance, then they should still be used because they are more appropriate for cases involving contracts made at sea due to their familiarity with such matters. Ultimately Justice Field concluded that while he agreed with much of what was said in the majority opinion about how state laws could apply here, ultimately these issues needed to be resolved through federal regulations and thus disagreed with their conclusion on this matter.