Goddard v. Foster was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Goddard, was held in a federal prison in the District of Columbia. Goddard sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which was denied. Goddard then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

In the case of Goddard v. Foster, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was wrongfully based on an interpretation of state law and not federal law. He contended that the court should have applied federal common law to determine whether or not Goddard had been deprived of his property without due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Field argued that even if state laws were applicable, they did not provide for any remedy against Foster because there was no evidence presented at trial showing any fraudulent intent on his part when he acquired title to Goddard’s land. Furthermore, Field asserted that it would be unjust for one party to benefit from another’s misfortune simply because they happened to acquire title first; rather than allowing this type of injustice under colorable titles such as those held by Foster here, courts should instead protect innocent purchasers who are unaware of prior claims made against their properties. Ultimately then, Justice Field concluded that since there was no proof presented at trial indicating fraud or bad faith on behalf of either party involved in this dispute over ownership rights and since neither state nor federal laws provided a remedy for Goddard's claim here – both parties must bear their own losses and suffer them accordingly with no relief being granted from either side