In the case of H. Ely Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals in 1925, certified public accountant H. Ely Goldsmith challenged a decision by the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA had denied his request to practice before it on grounds that he was not an attorney-at-law and therefore did not meet its requirements for representation eligibility under Section 1001(a) of Revenue Act 1924 which allowed only attorneys to represent taxpayers before it. Goldsmith argued this provision violated both due process and equal protection clauses as well as being contrary to common law rights allowing any person to choose their representative in legal matters. The Supreme Court ruled against him, upholding the BTA's right to set its own rules regarding who could appear before it based on professional qualifications deemed necessary for effective administration and enforcement of tax laws without infringing upon constitutional rights or violating common law principles.

In the dissenting opinion for H. Ely Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeal, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a tax penalty against Goldsmith violated his constitutional rights. The dissenting justices believed that the Board of Tax Appeals, an administrative body without judicial powers, had overstepped its authority by imposing penalties typically reserved for courts of law. They contended this action infringed upon Goldsmith’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions since he was essentially being punished without having been formally charged or tried in court. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "deficiency" under federal tax law as including penalties; instead arguing that such an expansive definition could lead to arbitrary and potentially excessive punishments not intended by Congress when drafting tax legislation.