The case of Gonzalez v. Crosby (2004) revolved around the issue of whether a federal habeas petition, filed after the one-year statute of limitations set by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), should be considered as second or successive under 28 U.S.C §2244(b). The petitioner, Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, argued that it was not "second or successive" because it challenged only the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in his first federal habeas proceeding rather than repeating claims made there. However, Florida's Secretary for Department of Corrections James V. Crosby contended that such an interpretation would allow prisoners to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive petitions by merely labeling them Rule 60(b) motions. In its decision, the Supreme Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion can sometimes be deemed a second or successive habeas corpus application but is not always so classified automatically; instead each case must be evaluated individually based on its specific facts and circumstances.

In the dissenting opinion for Gonzalez v. Crosby, it was argued that the majority's decision to dismiss Gonzalez's habeas petition as an abuse of writ under 28 U.S.C §2244(b) was incorrect and unjust. The dissenting justices believed that this case should not have been treated as a second or successive habeas corpus application because it raised a new claim based on a change in law, which occurred after his first federal habeas proceeding had concluded. They contended that such changes in law are exceptions to the general rule against repetitive petitions and thus should be allowed consideration by courts without being dismissed outright due to procedural bars. Furthermore, they expressed concern over how the majority’s interpretation could potentially limit prisoners' ability to challenge their convictions or sentences based on newly recognized constitutional rights if those rights were established after their initial round of federal habeas review.