The case of Good Samaritan Hospital, et al. v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services in 1992 revolved around the interpretation of a Medicare reimbursement provision by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The HHS had interpreted this provision to mean that hospitals could only be reimbursed for their actual costs rather than their customary charges when providing services to Medicare patients. A group of hospitals challenged this interpretation, arguing that they should be reimbursed based on their usual fees instead. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the HHS's interpretation stating it was reasonable and consistent with statutory intent. The court held that under Chevron U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council standard, if Congress has not directly addressed an issue through legislation then administrative agencies have discretion to make reasonable interpretations within those statutes' ambiguous areas.

In the dissenting opinion for Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, Justice Scalia argued that the majority misinterpreted the Medicare Act's provision on reimbursement rates for hospitals. He contended that while Congress intended to provide reasonable costs of services, it did not intend to cover all costs incurred by a hospital in providing those services. The Secretary’s interpretation of “reasonable cost” as meaning only "efficiently and economically provided" was consistent with this intent and should have been upheld under Chevron deference - a principle which instructs courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutes if they are reasonable. Furthermore, he criticized the majority’s reliance on legislative history instead of statutory text, arguing that such approach undermines legal certainty and predictability.