Goodlett v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a railroad company was liable for damages caused by a train accident. The plaintiff, Goodlett, was a passenger on a train operated by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. The train derailed, causing Goodlett to suffer serious injuries. Goodlett sued the railroad company, claiming that the company was negligent in its operation of the train. The Supreme Court held that the railroad company was liable for Goodlett's injuries. The Court found that the company had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of its trains, and that it had breached this duty by failing to properly maintain the tracks and equipment. The Court also held that the company was liable for the damages caused by the accident, even though the company had not been negligent in its operation of the train. The Court's decision in Goodlett v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad established that railroad companies are liable for damages caused by their negligence in the operation of their trains. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and has been used to establish the legal principle that companies have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of their businesses.

In Goodlett v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state statute that required railroads to pay for damages caused by their negligence violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The majority of justices held that it did not violate due process because there was no deprivation of property without due process of law since the railroad had been given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being ordered to pay damages. Justice Field dissented from this opinion, arguing that while states have broad authority over public safety matters, they cannot pass laws which deprive citizens of their property without providing them with some form of compensation or other protection against loss. He argued further that in this case, the statute imposed liability on railroads regardless of fault and thus constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of both federal constitutional principles as well as those found in many state constitutions at the time.