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10-76 GOODYEAR DUNLAP TIRES OPERATIONS V. BROWN DECISION BELOW: 681 S.E.2d 382 TO BE ARGUED IN TANDEM WITH 09-1343 CERT. GRANTED 9/28/2010 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction, on causes of action not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state, merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the stream of commerce by the defendant. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: COA08-944
In the case of Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al. v. Edgar D. Brown, et ux., co-administrators of the estate of Julian David Brown, et al., 2010, two North Carolina boys died in a bus accident while on a trip to France due to an allegedly defective tire made by Goodyear's Turkish subsidiary. The parents sued Goodyear USA and its foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina state court for wrongful death damages but the defendants argued that North Carolina courts lacked jurisdiction over them as they were not sufficiently connected with the state - their operations did not involve manufacturing or designing tires there nor did they have offices or employees based there. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Goodyear arguing that mere placement into 'stream-of-commerce' does not suffice for personal jurisdiction unless additional conduct shows intent to serve market in forum State; thus establishing precedent regarding specific versus general jurisdiction over corporations operating globally.
In the dissenting opinion for Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al. v. Edgar D. Brown, et ux., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the majority's decision to dismiss the case based on lack of jurisdiction was too restrictive and failed to consider modern business operations' realities. She contended that companies like Goodyear should be held accountable in any state where they market and sell their products because these activities establish a substantial connection with those states. According to her view, it is irrelevant whether or not the specific product causing harm was sold or manufactured within a particular state; what matters is if the company has continuous and systematic affiliations with that state through its commercial activities there.