Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company v. Goodyear Rubber Company was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1871. The case involved a dispute between two companies, both of which were owned by Charles Goodyear, over the use of the name "Goodyear" in their respective businesses. The India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company argued that the use of the name "Goodyear" by the Goodyear Rubber Company was an infringement of their trademark. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company, finding that the use of the name "Goodyear" by the Goodyear Rubber Company was an infringement of the India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company's trademark. The Court held that the use of the name "Goodyear" by the Goodyear Rubber Company was likely to cause confusion among consumers and was therefore an infringement of the India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company's trademark. The Court also held that the India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company was entitled to an injunction against the Goodyear Rubber Company to prevent further infringement. This case established the principle that a trademark is a form of property and that its use by another company can constitute an infringement of that property.

In the Supreme Court case of Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company v. Goodyear Rubber Company, Justice Harlan delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had failed to properly consider the facts and evidence presented by both parties. He noted that while it was true that there were similarities between some of the products produced by each company, they did not necessarily constitute infringement on one another’s trademarks or copyrights. Furthermore, he argued that even if such similarities existed, they would have been necessary for either party to compete effectively in their respective markets and should therefore be allowed under existing law. Additionally, Justice Harlan pointed out that since neither party had registered any trademark or copyright prior to this dispute arising, no legal protection could be provided against potential infringements from either side. Ultimately then, Justice Harlan concluded his dissent with an argument for greater consideration being given to all relevant factors before making a decision on whether or not infringement had occurred in this particular case.