This case was a dispute between Grace and American Central Insurance Company. Grace had purchased a policy from the company, and when a fire destroyed the property covered by the policy, Grace sought to recover the value of the property from the company. The company refused to pay, claiming that the policy had been cancelled prior to the fire. The Supreme Court held that the policy had not been cancelled, and that the company was liable for the value of the property destroyed by the fire. The Court found that the company had failed to provide Grace with the required notice of cancellation, and that the policy was still in effect at the time of the fire. The Court also held that the company was liable for the value of the property destroyed, as the policy had not been cancelled. The Court's decision was a victory for Grace, as it allowed her to recover the value of the property destroyed by the fire. The decision also established that insurance companies must provide notice of cancellation in order for a policy to be cancelled, and that failure to do so will result in the policy remaining in effect.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Grace and Another v. American Central Insurance Company, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect because it failed to consider a key provision of the policy at issue. The insurance policy stated that if any part of a building is destroyed by fire, then all parts must be replaced or repaired within one year from when notice was given to the insurer. In this case, only part of the building had been destroyed by fire and thus should have been replaced or repaired within one year from when notice was given; however, instead of following this provision as required under contract law principles, Justice Field argued that since more than one year had passed between when notice was given and when repairs were made on what remained standing after the fire damage occurred, there could not be an action for breach against American Central Insurance Company. He concluded his dissent with an argument in favor of enforcing contracts according to their plain language rather than allowing courts to interpret them differently based on extenuating circumstances such as time elapsed between events related to performance under those contracts.