In the case of Granberry v. Greer, Warden (1986), the U.S Supreme Court had to decide whether a federal court could hear an appeal from a state prisoner who failed to exhaust all available state remedies before filing for habeas corpus relief in federal court. The petitioner, Granberry, was convicted of murder and sentenced to 100 years imprisonment by an Illinois jury. He filed multiple unsuccessful appeals in the state courts before seeking habeas corpus relief in federal district court without exhausting his final option - petitioning for discretionary review with the Illinois Supreme Court. The District Court dismissed his petition but on appeal, Seventh Circuit reversed this decision stating that exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and can be overlooked if it's not raised as defense by State at initial stage. However, upon reaching the US Supreme Court, they disagreed with Seventh Circuit’s ruling and held that even though exhaustion requirement isn't jurisdictional per se; when a State has been given chance but fails to raise non-exhaustion defense initially doesn’t mean Federal Courts are obliged to ignore it later especially when interests of comity & judicial efficiency would be served better by requiring petitioner go back through proper channels i.e., exhaust all possible options within their own State first.

In the dissenting opinion for Granberry v. Greer, it was argued that a federal court should not be allowed to consider a habeas corpus petition if the prisoner has failed to exhaust all state remedies unless there are exceptional circumstances. The dissenting justices believed that this rule would encourage prisoners to bypass state courts and go directly to federal courts with their complaints, undermining the principle of comity between state and federal courts. They also expressed concern about potential abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by prisoners who might use it as a means of delaying execution or prolonging litigation rather than seeking genuine relief from unlawful imprisonment. Furthermore, they disagreed with majority's view on procedural default doctrine stating that its application should depend upon whether petitioner had fair opportunity in State court proceedings.