Graves v. Corbin was a Supreme Court case decided in 1891. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a tract of land in Texas. The plaintiff, Graves, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Corbin, to purchase the land. Corbin had agreed to convey the land to Graves upon payment of the purchase price. However, Corbin failed to convey the land as promised, and Graves sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that Corbin was liable for breach of contract. The Court found that Corbin had failed to fulfill his obligations under the contract and that Graves was entitled to damages for the breach. The Court also held that Corbin was liable for the costs of the suit, including attorney's fees. The decision in Graves v. Corbin established the principle that a party who breaches a contract is liable for damages and costs associated with the breach. This case is still cited today as an example of the importance of upholding contractual obligations.

In the Supreme Court case of Graves v. Corbin, Justice Harlan delivered a dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority had misconstrued the meaning of an 1871 statute and failed to recognize its true purpose. According to him, Congress intended for this law to provide relief from state laws that allowed creditors to take property without due process or compensation in order for them to collect debts owed by debtors who were insolvent at the time they incurred those debts. The majority's interpretation would have limited this protection only when a debtor was already insolvent at the time he acquired his property; however, Harlan believed it should extend beyond such cases as well and protect any debtor whose assets are insufficiently liquidated so as not be able pay off their creditors before being forced into bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, he argued that if Congress had wanted such a limitation on its protections then it would have included language explicitly stating so in its legislation rather than relying on what he viewed as an overly narrow interpretation of existing statutes which could lead courts down dangerous paths with regards to constitutional issues related thereto.