The case of Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association et al. v. Novotny in 1978 revolved around the issue of whether a violation of Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin could be considered as a basis for action under Section 1985(3), which provides civil remedy for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. The plaintiff Novotny was fired from his position at the bank after he supported female colleagues who were filing complaints about gender discrimination within the company. He then sued under Section 1985(3) claiming that his dismissal was part of a conspiracy to deprive him and his colleagues their right to equal protection from gender-based discrimination provided by Title VII. The Supreme Court ruled against Novotny stating that there cannot be derivative liability; meaning one cannot sue under section 1985(3) for violations of other statutes like Title VII because it would allow plaintiffs to bypass procedural requirements set out in those laws such as first filing complaint with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Therefore, while acknowledging that conspiracies involving discriminatory firings are reprehensible and should not go unpunished, they held that remedies must come through procedures outlined specifically by each statute.

In the dissenting opinion for Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association et al. v. Novotny, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with Congress' intent when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Section 1985(3) of Title 42. He believed that these laws were designed to provide broad protection against discrimination and should be interpreted as such by courts. The majority's narrow interpretation, according to him, would limit victims' ability to seek redress for discriminatory practices in violation of their civil rights. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s view that a conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3) could not stand unless there was an independent violation of a constitutional right or federal law outside Title VII; instead asserting that any act which interferes with rights protected by Title VII can form basis for a claim under Section 1985(3). Thus, he concluded his dissent by expressing concern about how this ruling might hinder efforts towards achieving equality in employment.