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In Gregory v. McVeigh, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a contract between two parties was valid even though it had not been signed by both parties. The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Gregory, had entered into an agreement with defendant Mr. McVeigh to purchase certain real estate for $1,500 and paid him a deposit of $200 as consideration for the sale. However, when he attempted to take possession of the property after paying off his debt in full according to their agreement, Mr. McVeigh refused on grounds that there was no written contract between them and thus no binding obligation on either party's part regarding ownership or transfer of title rights over said property; instead claiming that since only one signature appeared on their verbal agreement (his own) then it could be easily revoked at any time without consequence or legal recourse from either side due to its lack thereof being legally enforceable under common law principles governing contracts within US jurisdiction at large during such period(s). In response however Justice Miller delivered an opinion affirming validity & enforceability based upon mutual assent having been established through payment made by plaintiff towards satisfaction/completion thereof despite absence/lack formalized documentation - thereby ruling against defendant’s claim & allowing plaintiff rightful access thereto accordingly per terms agreed upon previously regardless same not having been formally documented via signature etcetera as originally requested by latter prior thereto dispute arising out same
Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Gregory v. McVeigh, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an absurd result. He argued that a judgment of ejectment could not be rendered against a party who had no interest in the property at issue because it would amount to nothing more than an empty formality with no practical effect. Furthermore, he noted that even if there were some legal basis for rendering such a judgment, it should have been done by way of motion rather than through another action entirely as this was both unnecessary and wasteful of judicial resources. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that while courts may sometimes be required to render judgments which are ineffective or unenforceable due to intervening events or changes in circumstances beyond their control, they must still adhere strictly to established principles when doing so lest they create confusion and uncertainty within the law itself.