In the case of Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a federal court in Massachusetts had jurisdiction over a suit brought by an injured worker against his employer, who was based in Delaware. The plaintiff, Grimes, argued that he should be allowed to sue for damages under Massachusetts law because he was injured while working on a project within the state. However, the defendant company contended that it could not be sued outside its home state of Delaware due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Raymond Concrete Pile Co., holding that even though some aspects of their business operations occurred within Massachusetts (such as hiring local workers and using local materials), these activities did not constitute sufficient contacts with the state for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. Therefore, they concluded that it would violate principles of fair play and substantial justice if Raymond were forced to defend itself from lawsuits filed in states where it does not have significant or continuous ties.

The dissenting opinion in the Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co case argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling, which dismissed an injured worker's claim against his employer for negligence, was incorrect. The dissent believed that there were significant factual disputes regarding whether or not the employer had been negligent and if this negligence resulted in injury to the employee. They felt these issues should have been decided by a jury rather than summarily dismissed by a judge. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of maritime law and its application in this case; arguing instead that under general maritime law, employers do owe their employees a duty of care – including providing safe working conditions - regardless of any contractual obligations between them.