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20-382 GUAM V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 950 F.3d 104 CERT. GRANTED 1/8/2021 QUESTION PRESENTED: For nearly half a century, the United States Navy discarded toxic waste at a dump that the Navy created in the 1940s on the Island of Guam, an unincorporated territory of the United States, without any environmental safeguards. The Navy then left Guam to clean up the site—a project that is likely to cost more than $160 million. Guam brought this suit to recover cleanup costs from the United States under Section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), which allows parties to recover remediation costs from other responsible parties within six years of the initiation of a remedial action. The district court concluded that Guam’s claim could proceed. The D.C. Circuit, however, held that Guam’s claim was precluded by CERCLA Section 113(f)(3)(B), in a decision that deepens two acknowledged circuit conflicts. Section 113(f)(3)(B) establishes a contribution remedy for any party that “has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action” in a “judicially approved settlement,” subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Id. § 9613 (f)(3)(B). Here, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 113(f)(3)(B) was triggered by a decade- old consent decree settling claims under the Clean Water Act (CWA)—even though that decree did not mention CERCLA, explicitly disclaimed any finding of liability, and left Guam exposed to future liability. And given that Guam filed suit more than three years after the consent decree was entered, the court held that Guam’s action is barred. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a non-CERCLA settlement can trigger a contribution claim under CERCLA Section 113(f)(3)(B). 2. Whether a settlement that expressly disclaims any liability determination and leaves the settling party exposed to future liability can trigger a contribution claim under CERCLA Section 113(f)(3)(B). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 19-5131
In the case of Guam v. United States, 2020, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a settlement that Guam had entered into with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under federal law constituted a resolution of liability for purposes of contribution actions. The dispute arose from contamination at Ordot Dump on Guam where the U.S Navy disposed toxic waste for decades. In 2004, under Clean Water Act orders, Guam and EPA agreed upon cleanup efforts without explicitly resolving past or future liability issues. Later in 2017, when Guam sued US government seeking cost recovery for cleanup expenses under Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), it was countered by an argument that such claim could only be made within three years after a settlement - which expired in this case as per their interpretation. The Supreme Court ruled against this argument stating that because CERCLA liabilities were not resolved during initial agreement between EPA and Guam; hence its lawsuit against US government is valid even after more than decade since original settlement.
In the dissenting opinion for Guam v. United States, Justice Thomas argued that the majority misinterpreted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). He contended that CERCLA's settlement procedures should not be applied to non-CERCLA lawsuits like Guam’s Clean Water Act suit against the U.S Navy. According to him, a settlement under one statute does not necessarily resolve liability under another unless explicitly stated in an agreement. Therefore, he disagreed with the majority's view that Guam had missed its opportunity to seek cost recovery from the U.S Navy because it did not do so within three years of its 2004 Clean Water Act settlement with EPA. In his view, this interpretation unfairly penalizes entities like Guam who may have settled claims without realizing they were also forfeiting their rights under other environmental laws.