Hale v. Akers was a Supreme Court case that was decided in 1935. The case involved a dispute between two parties over the ownership of a piece of land in Kentucky. The plaintiff, Hale, claimed that he had purchased the land from the defendant, Akers, in 1891. Akers, however, argued that the deed was invalid because it had not been properly recorded. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Hale, ruling that the deed was valid and that Hale was the rightful owner of the land. The Court held that the deed was valid because it had been delivered to Hale and accepted by him, and that the failure to record the deed did not invalidate it. The Court also held that Akers had no right to reclaim the land after the deed had been delivered and accepted. The decision in Hale v. Akers established the principle that a deed is valid even if it is not recorded, as long as it has been delivered and accepted. This principle has been applied in numerous cases since then, and is still used today.

In the Supreme Court case of Hale v. Akers, Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was wrong and should be reversed. He believed that the lower court had correctly found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence on behalf of Akers, and thus his motion for summary judgment should have been denied. In addition, Douglas argued that since this case involved an automobile accident between two private individuals, it would not set any precedent regarding governmental immunity from liability for torts committed by its employees or agents; therefore, it did not need to be decided at all. Furthermore, he noted that even if one were to accept the majority’s reasoning about governmental immunity from tort liability in such cases as valid law (which he did not), then they still erred because their ruling failed to take into account certain facts presented during trial which showed clear negligence on behalf of Akers. Ultimately, Justice Douglas concluded by urging reversal so as “to give effect to what appears [in his view] clearly established principles governing tort actions against government officials."