In the case of Hambro & Another v. Casey, Receiver, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a receiver appointed by a court of equity had the power to sell the mortgaged property of a debtor without the consent of the mortgagee. The Court held that a receiver appointed by a court of equity has the power to sell mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagee, provided that the sale is made in good faith and for the best interests of all parties involved. The case arose when the mortgagee, Hambro & Another, sought to enjoin the receiver, Casey, from selling the mortgaged property of a debtor without their consent. The mortgagee argued that the receiver had no authority to sell the property without their consent. The Court disagreed, holding that a receiver appointed by a court of equity has the power to sell mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagee, provided that the sale is made in good faith and for the best interests of all parties involved. The Court reasoned that a receiver appointed by a court of equity is a fiduciary, and as such, has a duty to act in the best interests of all parties involved. The Court further reasoned that a sale of mortgaged property by a receiver is in the best interests of all parties involved if it is made in good faith and for the best price obtainable. Therefore, the Court held that a receiver appointed by a court of equity has the power to sell mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagee, provided that the sale is made in good faith and for the best interests of all parties involved.

In Hambro & Another v. Casey, Receiver, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a receiver appointed by a court of equity had authority to sell certain mortgaged property without first obtaining an order from the court. The majority opinion held that such power did exist and could be exercised in appropriate circumstances. However, Justice Field dissented on the grounds that receivers should not have such broad powers as it would allow them to act independently of any judicial oversight or control. He argued that if Congress intended for receivers to have this kind of authority then they would have explicitly stated so in their legislation; instead, he believed it was up to courts of equity alone to determine when and how mortgaged properties were sold off. Furthermore, he noted that allowing receivers too much discretion could lead them down paths which may not be beneficial for all parties involved in the case at hand - namely creditors who are owed money from these sales proceeds - thus making judicial supervision necessary before any sale is finalized.