Term: 2017
Docket: 16-658
Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services Of Chicago
- Pro
16-658 HAMER V. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING DECISION BELOW: 835 F.3d 761 CERT. GRANTED 2/27/2017 QUESTION PRESENTED: A district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal in a civil case "upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, . . . upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause." 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). Here, upon timely motion, the district court granted Petitioner Charmaine Hamer ("Ms. Hamer") a sixty-day extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Ms. Hamer filed a notice of appeal within the time set by the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nevertheless sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it was deprived of jurisdiction because Ms. Hamer's notice of appeal was filed outside the time permitted by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provide that "[n]o extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C). The question presented is as follows: Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) can deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction over an appeal that is statutorily timely, as the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have concluded, or whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is instead a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule because it is not derived from a statute, as the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have concluded, and therefore subject to equitable considerations such as forfeiture, waiver, and the unique-circumstances doctrine. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 15-3764
In the case of Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 2017, Charmaine Hamer filed a lawsuit against her former employer for alleged violations of federal anti-discrimination law and retaliation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant (Neighborhood Housing Services) and gave Hamer 14 days to appeal this decision as per Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). However, before that deadline expired, the court extended it by another month. When she appealed after this extension but within the original limit set by statute (28 U.S.C §2107), her appeal was dismissed because it was deemed untimely according to FRAP's rule. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed this dismissal on November 8th, stating that FRAP’s time limits are not jurisdictional; instead they are claim-processing rules which can be waived or forfeited if not properly invoked. Furthermore, while courts cannot extend statutory deadlines themselves unless allowed by law explicitly - such as under §2107(c) where extensions may be given due to excusable neglect or good cause - these restrictions do not apply when parties fail to insist on their rights timely.
In the dissenting opinion for Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case because it involved a procedural rule rather than a statutory limit on federal courts' authority. He contended that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which limits extensions for filing notices of appeal to no more than 30 days beyond the original deadline, is not jurisdictional but merely claims-processing rules. Therefore, he believed that if parties do not insist on its application in a timely manner or forfeit their right by failing to raise an objection at all - as happened here - then lower courts should be able to waive them without any interference from higher authorities like Supreme Court. The majority's decision according to him was based on an erroneous interpretation and thus set a dangerous precedent by allowing appellate deadlines set forth in court-made rules equal dignity with those expressed in congressionally enacted statutes.
