In Hamilton v. Dillin, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when the petitioner, Hamilton, was arrested and held in federal custody in the District of Columbia. Hamilton then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, seeking his release from federal custody. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granted the writ, and the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia was ordered to release Hamilton. The United States government then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the government, holding that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the power to issue writs of habeas corpus was a power reserved to the federal government, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Hamilton v. Dillin, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that a contract between two parties is binding on both of them, regardless of whether it has been fully performed or not. The contract in this case stated that if either party failed to perform their obligations under it, then they would forfeit all rights to any money due from the other party as a result of its performance. Therefore, Justice Field reasoned that since one party had failed to fulfill their obligation under the contract by failing to pay what was owed when due, they were no longer entitled to receive anything from the other side for performing its part of the agreement. Furthermore, he noted that even though there may have been some hardship caused by enforcing this forfeiture clause against one side while allowing payment for services rendered by another side despite non-payment does not make such an arrangement illegal or invalidate it; rather than being unfairness towards one side over another as suggested by his colleagues in dissent - Justice Field argued instead that such arrangements are necessary and beneficial because they provide incentives for people who enter into contracts with each other so as to ensure full compliance with contractual terms and conditions going forward