In Hampton v. Rouse, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties was valid. The contract in question was between Hampton, a former slave, and Rouse, a former slave owner. Hampton had been freed from slavery and had entered into a contract with Rouse to work for him for a period of time in exchange for wages. Hampton had worked for Rouse for a period of time, but then stopped working and refused to pay the wages he had agreed to. Rouse then sued Hampton for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that the contract between Hampton and Rouse was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that, although Hampton had been a slave at the time the contract was made, he was now a free man and was therefore capable of entering into a valid contract. The Court also noted that the contract was not against public policy, as it was not an attempt to re-enslave Hampton. The Court's decision in Hampton v. Rouse established that former slaves were capable of entering into valid contracts and that such contracts were enforceable in a court of law. This decision was an important step in the recognition of the rights of former slaves and their ability to participate in the economic life of the United States.

In the case of Hampton v. Rouse, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the court should not have granted an injunction to prevent William H. Rouse from interfering with Thomas J. Hampton's right to fish in waters off of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. He believed that it was within Congress' power to regulate fishing on navigable waters and thus any dispute between two individuals over such rights should be left for Congress or state legislatures to decide rather than being decided by a federal court through an injunction. Furthermore, Field noted that there were no laws preventing either party from fishing in those waters and therefore neither had exclusive rights over them; as such, both parties could continue their activities without interference from each other or the courts unless otherwise provided by law. In conclusion, Justice Field argued against granting injunctive relief because it would effectively create new legal rights where none existed before and this was beyond the scope of what federal courts are allowed to do under existing law at the time