In the Hanford v. Davies case of 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in California that had its roots in Spanish and Mexican law before California became part of the United States. The plaintiff, Hanford, claimed title to certain lands under a patent issued by the United States government based on an old Spanish grant confirmed by Congress. The defendant, Davies, contested this claim arguing that he held rightful possession through adverse possession - essentially claiming that because he had occupied and used the land for many years without challenge from anyone else (including Hanford), it should now be legally his property. The court ruled against Davies' argument of adverse possession due to lack of sufficient evidence proving continuous use or occupation for five years as required under Californian law at that time. Furthermore, they stated any such claims could not begin until after confirmation and issuance of patents recognizing original grants made during Spanish/Mexican rule. Therefore, since there was no proof showing occupancy prior to patent issuance or subsequent continuous usage for five years thereafter by Davies; nor any action taken within statutory period challenging validity/ownership rights conferred upon Hanford via said patent – judgement was given in favor of plaintiff (Hanford).

In the dissenting opinion for Hanford v. Davies, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling regarding property rights and inheritance laws did not adequately consider certain aspects of California law. The dissenting justices believed that under California law, a wife had an equal right to her husband's property upon his death if there were no will in place. They felt this principle should have been applied in this case where Mr. Hanford died without leaving a will and his estate was claimed by both Mrs. Hanford and Mr. Davies (a creditor). The dissenters disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of community property laws which they thought unfairly favored creditors over surviving spouses, arguing instead for an interpretation more protective of spousal rights.