In the case of Harbor Tug and Barge Company v. John Papai et ux., 1996, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a worker who was injured while performing tasks on a ship did not qualify for protection under federal maritime law because he lacked substantial connection to his employer's vessels or fleet. The plaintiff, John Papai, had been hired by Harbor Tug and Barge Company for one day to paint a ship. During this job, he fell from an unsecured ladder and suffered injuries. He sued the company under federal maritime laws which provide protections for seamen but require them to have more than just temporary employment with their employers' vessels or fleets in order to be eligible. The court found that since Papai only worked for one day on one vessel without any expectation of continued employment with other vessels owned by Harbor Tug and Barge Company, he could not be considered as having significant relationship with his employer's fleet thus ineligible for protection under these laws.

In the dissenting opinion for Harbor Tug and Barge Company v. John Papai et ux., Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, argued that the majority's decision was too narrow in its interpretation of who qualifies as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. The dissent noted that previous court decisions have recognized that maritime employment is often sporadic and irregular, yet these workers still face significant risks inherent to their work at sea. Therefore, they believed it was incorrect to deny seaman status based on lack of substantial connection with a single vessel or identifiable group of vessels. They also disagreed with the majority’s view that jury determination should be reserved only for “uncertain or close cases.” Instead, they asserted all reasonable doubt regarding whether an individual is a seaman should be resolved in favor of granting them this status due to the remedial nature of federal legislation designed to protect maritime workers' rights.