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In this case, Benjamin D. Harris was the plaintiff in error and William Hardeman, Henry R. W. Hill, Cotesworth P. Smith, and Henry A. Moore were defendants in error who had been appointed as commissioners to settle a boundary dispute between two states: Georgia and Alabama. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of these commissioners by Congress did not violate any constitutional provisions or laws passed by Congress since it was within their power to do so under Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution which grants them authority over disputes between states concerning boundaries or other matters related thereto; furthermore they found that there was no evidence presented showing bad faith on behalf of any party involved in this matter nor any other legal impediment preventing such an action from taking place thus upholding the decision made by said Commissioners regarding said boundary dispute between Georgia and Alabama as validly binding upon both parties concerned therein without further recourse necessary for either side to take against one another with respect thereto at law or otherwise before a court of competent jurisdiction thereof accordingly heretofore henceforth now forevermore amen!
In the dissenting opinion of Benjamin D. Harris v. William Hardeman, Henry R. W. Hill, Cotesworth P Smith and Henry A Moore, it was argued that the court should have granted a new trial to Harris due to errors in jury instructions given by the judge during his original trial for trespass on property owned by Hardeman et al. The dissent noted that while there were some facts presented at trial which could support a finding of trespass against Harris, other evidence showed he had permission from one of the owners to be on their land and thus no trespass occurred under Georgia law as it existed at that time. Furthermore, they argued that even if there had been sufficient evidence presented for a conviction of trespass without proof of permission from an owner or tenant in possession then this should have been made clear in jury instructions so jurors would understand what constituted trespassing according to state law rather than relying solely upon their own understanding or interpretation thereof when deciding whether guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been established against Harris..