In the case of Harris, Administrator v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving inheritance tax law in Utah and federal jurisdiction over state taxation matters. The controversy arose after an individual died leaving bonds to his heirs that were issued by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and other government agencies which under federal law were exempt from taxation. However, Utah imposed an inheritance tax on these bonds which was challenged by the estate administrator who argued it violated supremacy clause of Constitution as they are federally exempted securities. The court held that while states cannot directly tax federal instruments or property, they can indirectly do so through non-discriminatory estate or inheritance taxes without violating constitutional principles provided such taxes don't interfere with any governmental function nor discriminate against holders of such obligations compared to those holding other types of property subject to similar taxes. This ruling established important precedent regarding balance between state rights and powers versus those reserved for federal government especially concerning issues related to fiscal policy and interstate commerce.

In the dissenting opinion for Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., it was argued that the majority decision failed to properly interpret and apply Utah law regarding trusts and estates. The dissent believed that, under Utah law, a trust could not be created without clear intent from the settlor, which they felt was lacking in this case. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "income" as used in Mrs. Kearns' will, arguing that it should have been interpreted more broadly to include capital gains from property sales rather than just interest or dividends earned on investments held by the estate. Furthermore, they contended that even if a trust had been validly established under Mrs.Kearns' will, its terms did not clearly provide for distribution of income only to her children during their lifetimes followed by distribution of principal upon their deaths; instead, they read these provisions as allowing both income and principal distributions during life with any remaining balance distributed at death.