In the 1988 case of Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of Daniel J. Connaughton, a candidate for municipal judge who sued a newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications for defamation after they published false information about him during his campaign. The court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to suggest that the newspaper acted with "actual malice," meaning they knew their statements were false or recklessly disregarded whether they were true or not when publishing them - which is required to prove defamation against public figures according to precedent set in New York Times Co v Sullivan (1964). This decision reinforced First Amendment protections but also clarified standards for proving actual malice in libel cases involving public figures.

In the dissenting opinion for Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, Justice Byron White argued that the majority's decision to overturn a jury verdict was inappropriate and inconsistent with previous Supreme Court decisions on defamation cases involving public figures. He contended that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the jury's finding of actual malice by Harte-Hanks towards Daniel Connaughton, including testimony about an editorial meeting where staff members discussed their dislike for him and decided not to interview certain sources who might provide information in his favor. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for reevaluating witness credibility and making its own determinations about factual disputes – tasks traditionally left to juries rather than appellate courts. In conclusion, Justice White believed that this case did not meet the high standard required for overturning a jury verdict based on insufficient evidence.