Hawes v. Oakland was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state law could be used to invalidate a city ordinance. The case arose when the city of Oakland, California passed an ordinance that prohibited the sale of certain types of property without the consent of the owner. The state of California then passed a law that declared the ordinance to be invalid. The plaintiffs, who were the owners of the property in question, argued that the state law was unconstitutional because it interfered with the city's right to pass ordinances. The Supreme Court held that the state law was unconstitutional because it interfered with the city's right to pass ordinances. The Court reasoned that the state law was an unconstitutional interference with the city's right to pass ordinances because it was an attempt to control the city's internal affairs. The Court also held that the state law was an unconstitutional interference with the city's right to pass ordinances because it was an attempt to control the city's internal affairs without the consent of the people of Oakland. The Court concluded that the state law was an unconstitutional interference with the city's right to pass ordinances and that the ordinance was valid.

In Hawes v. Oakland, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a state law that allowed citizens of one municipality to sue another violated the Constitution's Contract Clause. The majority opinion held that it did not violate this clause because it only applied prospectively and did not interfere with existing contracts between municipalities. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that the law in question interfered with existing contracts by allowing citizens of one municipality to sue another for debts incurred before its passage. He argued further that such interference was unconstitutional as it impaired contractual obligations already in place between two parties and thus violated the Contract Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S Constitution which states "No State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." In conclusion, Justice Field believed that since there were no exceptions or qualifications made regarding preexisting contracts when passing this legislation, he could not agree with his colleagues' ruling on this case and therefore dissented from their opinion.