In the 1911 case of Helm v. Zarecor, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in Arkansas. The plaintiff, Helm, claimed that he had purchased certain lands from one McGehee who had obtained them through a tax sale. However, these lands were also claimed by Zarecor and others on the basis of an older patent issued to their ancestor by the United States government. The lower court ruled in favor of Zarecor and his co-defendants based on this earlier claim. Helm appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that McGehee's purchase at a tax sale superseded any previous claims because it was made while no other claims existed against those lands. He contended that since there were no adverse claims when he bought from McGehee, his title should be considered superior. The Supreme Court disagreed with Helm’s argument stating that even though there might not have been any active litigation or contestation about these lands at time of purchase does not mean they are free from all prior rights or encumbrances which may exist under law but simply haven’t been enforced yet. Therefore, despite having bought these properties without knowledge of competing interests doesn't necessarily make him rightful owner if such interests do indeed exist as per law - like in this case where defendants held an older patent for same property granted directly by U.S Government itself. Thus upholding lower court's decision in favour of defendants (Zarecors), SCOTUS dismissed appeal filed by

The dissenting opinion in Helm v. Zarecor argued that the majority's decision to uphold a state law requiring corporations to pay an annual franchise tax was incorrect. The dissenters believed that this law violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which guarantees equal protection under the law, because it unfairly targeted corporations while exempting other types of businesses from paying similar taxes. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of what constitutes "property" under this amendment, arguing that corporate franchises should be considered property and thus protected from discriminatory taxation. Furthermore, they contended that by allowing states to impose such taxes on corporations without any clear guidelines or limitations, the court was essentially giving them carte blanche to discriminate against certain types of businesses at will.