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20-637 HEMPHILL V. NEW YORK DECISION BELOW: 150 N.E.3d 356 CERT. GRANTED 4/19/2021 QUESTION PRESENTED: A litigant’s argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial is often deemed to “open the door” to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence. The question presented is: Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 66 SSM 5
Hemphill v. New York is a case that was recently heard by the United States Supreme Court. The issue before the court was whether or not New York’s requirement of an in-person hearing for certain parole revocation proceedings violated due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioner, Hemphill, argued that his right to due process had been violated because he had been denied an opportunity to appear at a parole revocation hearing and present evidence on his behalf via video conference instead of in person. The state of New York argued that its policy requiring all hearings be held in person did not violate any constitutional protections as it provided sufficient procedural safeguards for those facing potential revocation of their release from prison. Ultimately, the court ruled against Hemphill and found that there were no violations of due process since he received notice prior to his hearing and could have presented witnesses if necessary during this time period as well as submit written statements or other evidence on his behalf without being physically present at the proceeding itself.
In the case of Hemphill v. New York, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state law that prohibited the sale of lottery tickets was constitutional. The majority opinion held that the law was constitutional, but Justice Harlan dissented. Justice Harlan argued that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that the law was arbitrary and capricious, and that it was not necessary to protect the public from the evils of gambling. He argued that the law was an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power, and that it was an infringement on the right of individuals to pursue their own interests. Justice Harlan also argued that the law was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that the law was not applied equally to all citizens, as it only applied to those who sold lottery tickets, and not to those who purchased them. He argued that this was a form of discrimination, and that it was not necessary to protect the public from the evils of gambling. Justice Harlan concluded his dissent by arguing that the law was an unconstitutional infringement on the right of individuals to pursue their own interests, and that it was an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power. He argued that the law should be struck down as unconstitutional.