Hendrick v. Lindsay et al. was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when the petitioner, William Hendrick, was arrested by federal officers in the state of Georgia and taken into federal custody. The state court issued a writ of habeas corpus to the federal officers, ordering them to bring Hendrick before the court. The federal officers refused to comply with the writ, arguing that the state court did not have the authority to issue such a writ. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court could not interfere with the federal government's exercise of that right. The Court's decision in Hendrick v. Lindsay et al. established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal custody. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that the federal government has exclusive authority over the detention of prisoners.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in this case. He argued that the majority's decision was based on a misapplication of the law and an incorrect interpretation of prior cases. According to Justice Field, Congress had not intended for patents to be issued without proper examination or investigation into their validity. Furthermore, he noted that if such patents were allowed to stand, it would create confusion and uncertainty in patent law by allowing invalid patents to remain valid despite being improperly granted. Additionally, Justice Field argued that while there may have been some negligence involved with granting the patent at issue here, it did not rise to a level where it should void its validity as established by previous Supreme Court decisions. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded that since no fraud or intentional wrongdoing had occurred during the issuance process of this particular patent and since Congress had never intended for such negligent actions alone to nullify a validly-granted patent; therefore he dissented from his colleagues' ruling which voided said patent due its alleged improper grant procedure.