In Richard H. Hendrickson v. Samuel L. Hinckley, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin heard a case involving an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant on an action for damages brought by the complainant against him for trespass and injury to his property rights. The complaint alleged that the defendant had wrongfully entered upon certain lands belonging to complainant and cut down trees thereon without permission or authority from either party having legal title thereto, thereby causing damage to plaintiff's property rights in said land as well as depriving him of timber growing thereon which was worth $100 at least. The court found that although it could not be determined with certainty who owned title to said land, since both parties claimed ownership thereof, yet it appeared clear that neither party had any right or authority whatever over such lands except what they derived through their respective titles; therefore no action would lie against either one for trespass committed therein unless he should have been shown to have been guilty of some act amounting substantially to fraud or force in obtaining possession thereof; but here no such facts were proven nor even suggested by evidence adduced at trial so judgment was rendered accordingly in favor of defendant Hinckley dismissing plaintiff’s claim with costs assessed against him

In Richard H. Hendrickson v. Samuel L. Hinckley, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties could be enforced when it had been made without consideration and in violation of an existing statute prohibiting such contracts. The majority opinion held that the contract was unenforceable because it violated public policy as expressed by the statute; however, Justice Catron dissented from this decision on several grounds. He argued that since there were no allegations of fraud or mistake involved in making the agreement, its validity should not depend upon considerations of public policy but rather on principles of equity and justice which would allow for enforcement if both parties agreed to abide by its terms and conditions at the time they entered into it. Furthermore, he noted that while statutes may prohibit certain types of agreements under some circumstances, they do not necessarily render them void ab initio (from inception). Therefore, even though this particular agreement violated a law prohibiting such contracts without consideration being given or received beforehand, Justice Catron believed that enforcing it would still be consistent with equitable principles since both parties had voluntarily consented to its terms at one point in time before any legal prohibition came into effect