Herhold v. Upton was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Herhold, was held in a federal prison in California and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to issue such a writ. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used in federal courts, and that the state court did not have the authority to issue such a writ. The Court's decision in Herhold v. Upton established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal habeas corpus law.

Justice Harlan delivered the dissenting opinion in Herhold v. Upton, a case concerning whether or not an individual could be held liable for damages caused by another person's negligence when they had provided them with a dangerous instrumentality. Justice Harlan argued that the majority decision was wrong because it failed to consider certain facts of the case and instead relied on broad principles of law which did not apply to this particular situation. He believed that under common law, one who provides another with a dangerous instrumentality is responsible for any damage resulting from its use if there is evidence showing that he knew or should have known about its potential danger and yet still allowed it to be used without taking proper precautions against harm being done. Furthermore, he argued that even if liability were found in such cases, then those providing the instrumentality would only be liable up to their own degree of fault rather than having absolute responsibility as suggested by the majority opinion.