In Hester v. Illinois, the U.S Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a criminal defendant's constitutional rights were violated when he was not allowed to cross-examine a witness about his pending charges in another jurisdiction. The case involved an individual named Hester who had been convicted of murder based largely on the testimony of an accomplice who had charges pending against him in another state at the time of trial. On appeal, Hester argued that he should have been permitted to question this witness about these other charges as part of his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment. However, both lower courts denied this argument and upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with these rulings and affirmed Hester's conviction by declining review without comment or dissenting opinion from any justice. In doing so, it implicitly endorsed the view that while defendants generally have broad latitude in questioning witnesses for potential bias or credibility issues under their confrontation rights, there are limits on such inquiries where they might confuse jurors or unduly prejudice a witness - particularly if those matters are unrelated to facts directly bearing upon guilt or innocence in current proceedings.

In the dissenting opinion for Hester v. Illinois, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold Hester's conviction on grounds of his refusal to submit a handwriting sample violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. The dissenting justices believed that compelling an individual to provide physical evidence such as handwriting samples is tantamount to forcing them into testimonial communication, which should be protected under the Constitution. They contended that this ruling could potentially open up dangerous precedents where individuals can be compelled by law enforcement agencies or courts to produce incriminating evidence against themselves in violation of their constitutional rights. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority’s distinction between physical and communicative acts, arguing instead for a broader interpretation of what constitutes self-incrimination.