Hewitt v. Filbert & Another was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case involved a prisoner, William Hewitt, who was being held in a federal prison in Pennsylvania. Hewitt had been convicted of a crime in the state of New York and was serving his sentence in the federal prison. Hewitt filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court of Pennsylvania, arguing that he was being unlawfully detained in the federal prison. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner being held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain prisoners. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a prisoner's detention, and not to challenge the merits of the underlying conviction.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Hewitt v. Filbert & Another, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted a provision of an act passed by Congress in 1866. The act provided for the sale of certain public lands and stated that any person who was entitled to pre-emption rights on those lands could purchase them at their appraised value. The majority held that this language applied only to persons who were already living on or cultivating these lands prior to passage of the Act, while Justice Field argued it should be interpreted more broadly as applying also to persons who had previously made improvements upon such land but not yet taken possession. He noted that if Congress intended for only those already occupying or cultivating such land before passage of the Act to benefit from its provisions, they would have used clearer language than "entitled" when describing potential purchasers; instead, he suggested they would have said something like "in actual occupation." Furthermore, he argued there was no reason why someone with pre-emption rights should not be allowed to purchase even if they hadn't yet taken physical possession - after all, many settlers did make improvements without taking formal possession until later due either financial constraints or other reasons beyond their control. In conclusion Justice Field urged his colleagues in the majority reconsider their interpretation and allow individuals with pre-emption rights regardless of whether they were physically present at time of passage so long as evidence showed intent take legal ownership over property soon thereafter