In the case of Hicks v. Feiock (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support is criminal or civil in nature, and thus what standard of proof should be applied. The respondent, Feiock, had been found guilty of contempt for failing to meet his child support obligations but argued that he did not have the ability to pay and therefore could not be held in contempt under California law without being proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt - a higher standard than typically required in civil cases. The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that when punishment is punitive rather than remedial (i.e., intended solely as deterrence or retribution rather than aimed at compensating the injured party), it must be considered criminal regardless of its label by state law; hence requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, since it was unclear if this particular punishment was indeed punitive or remedial due to ambiguous language used by lower courts, they remanded back down for further clarification.

In the dissenting opinion for Hicks v. Feiock, Justice Scalia argued that the contempt proceeding against Mr. Feiock should be considered criminal rather than civil due to its punitive nature and because it was not designed to coerce compliance with a court order but instead sought to punish past noncompliance. He disagreed with the majority's view that intent is necessary for punishment, arguing that this would exclude many traditional forms of punishment such as fines or imprisonment where intent is irrelevant. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on 'intent' as an unreliable test which could lead to arbitrary results depending on how judges interpret it in different cases. Instead, he proposed a clearer rule: if a fixed sentence is imposed without any provision for purging through future compliance then it should be deemed criminal regardless of other factors.