In the case of Hicks, District Attorney of Orange County, et al. v. Pleasure House, Inc., et al., 1971, the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a local ordinance that required businesses to obtain licenses for coin-operated amusement devices violated constitutional rights. The defendants were operators of an adult bookstore and peep-show arcade who had been denied a license under this ordinance due to their failure to meet certain requirements such as providing sufficient parking spaces and maintaining proper lighting conditions in viewing booths. They argued that these restrictions infringed upon their First Amendment right to freedom of speech by effectively censoring the content they could display. The court ruled against them on grounds that the licensing scheme did not constitute prior restraint because it didn't give officials discretion over which messages could be conveyed or suppress any particular viewpoint but rather aimed at regulating secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments like crime rates and property values in surrounding areas. Therefore, while acknowledging potential chilling effect on free expression caused by excessive fees or arbitrary enforcement procedures inherent in such regulatory systems, justices found no evidence suggesting either scenario here thus upheld validity of said law.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Hicks v. Pleasure House, Inc., argued that the majority's decision was an overreach and a violation of states' rights. The dissenters believed that it was not within the purview of federal courts to interfere with state laws regarding liquor licenses unless there is clear evidence of discrimination or other constitutional violations. They contended that this case did not meet those criteria as no such violations were evident in Orange County's denial of a liquor license to Pleasure House, Inc. Furthermore, they expressed concern about setting a dangerous precedent where federal courts could potentially override any state law based on subjective interpretations rather than concrete legal principles.