In Hill v. Harding, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether a state court could enjoin a federal court from hearing a case. The case arose when the plaintiff, Hill, sought to enjoin the defendant, Harding, from proceeding with a suit in a federal court. Hill argued that the state court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and that the federal court should not be allowed to hear the case. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the power to enjoin the federal court from hearing the case. The Court reasoned that the state court lacked the authority to interfere with the federal court's jurisdiction. The Court further noted that the state court's decision to enjoin the federal court was an attempt to interfere with the federal court's power to decide cases. The Court concluded that the state court's decision to enjoin the federal court was an unconstitutional interference with the federal court's jurisdiction. The Court held that the state court's decision was invalid and that the federal court could proceed with the case. The Court also noted that the state court's decision was an attempt to interfere with the federal court's power to decide cases, which was unconstitutional.

In Hill v. Harding, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by a citizen of another state against citizens of the same other state in which suit was brought. The majority opinion held that it did not have such jurisdiction and reversed the judgment of the lower court. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that under Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the U.S Constitution, Congress has given states authority to exercise original jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different states when those parties are domiciled within their respective states at commencement or service is made upon them there. He argued further that since no federal statute existed on point regarding this issue, then it should be left up to each individual state's laws as they pertain to diversity cases and thus concluded that it would be inappropriate for him or any other justice on behalf of all fifty-states to make such a ruling without first consulting with each one individually about its own particular statutes pertaining thereto.