Hinckley v. Gilman, Clinton, and Springfield Railroad Company was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a railroad company was liable for damages caused by a collision between two of its trains. The plaintiff, Hinckley, was a passenger on one of the trains and was injured in the collision. He sued the railroad company for damages, claiming that the company was negligent in its operation of the trains. The Supreme Court held that the railroad company was liable for the damages caused by the collision. The Court reasoned that the company had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of its trains, and that it had breached this duty by failing to take proper precautions to prevent the collision. The Court also held that the company was liable for the damages caused by the collision, even though the collision was caused by the negligence of the engineer of one of the trains. The Court's decision in Hinckley v. Gilman, Clinton, and Springfield Railroad Company established that railroad companies are liable for damages caused by collisions between their trains, even if the collision was caused by the negligence of one of the engineers. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving railroad companies and their liability for damages caused by collisions.

In Hinckley v. Gilman, Clinton, and Springfield Railroad Company, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a railroad company had the right to take possession of land without paying for it. The majority opinion held that the railroad company did not have this right; however, Justice Field dissented from this ruling. He argued that under Illinois law at the time of purchase by Hinckley in 1867 (the year before construction began on the railway), there was an implied agreement between purchasers and railroads that allowed them to enter onto private property for purposes of constructing their railways without having to pay additional compensation beyond what they already paid for purchasing said lands. Furthermore, he argued that since no specific provision existed in either state or federal laws prohibiting such agreements at this time period then these contracts should be upheld as valid legal instruments regardless if they were made prior or after construction began on said railway line.