Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1871. The case involved a dispute between Hoffman & Co., a firm of commission merchants, and the Bank of Milwaukee. Hoffman & Co. had deposited a large sum of money with the Bank of Milwaukee, and the Bank had issued a certificate of deposit for the amount. Hoffman & Co. then sold the certificate to a third party, who then presented it to the Bank for payment. The Bank refused to pay, claiming that the certificate had been issued in error. Hoffman & Co. then sued the Bank for breach of contract, arguing that the Bank had issued the certificate in good faith and was therefore obligated to honor it. The Supreme Court agreed with Hoffman & Co., ruling that the Bank was liable for breach of contract. The Court held that the Bank had issued the certificate in good faith and was therefore obligated to honor it. The Court also held that the Bank was not entitled to any set-off or counterclaim against Hoffman & Co. for any alleged errors or omissions in the certificate. The Court's ruling established that banks are liable for breach of contract when they issue certificates of deposit in good faith. It also established that banks are not entitled to any set-off or counterclaim against the depositor for any alleged errors or omissions in the certificate. This ruling has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving banks and certificates of deposit.

In Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a state court had jurisdiction to hear a case involving an out-of-state defendant and an in-state plaintiff when the cause of action arose from events that occurred outside of the state's borders. The majority opinion held that such cases were not within the scope of jurisdiction for state courts, as it would be unconstitutional to force citizens from other states into defending themselves against lawsuits in another state without their consent or presence there. However, Justice Field dissented on this ruling, arguing that since Congress has granted authority over certain matters to each individual State under its power to regulate commerce between them, then these States should have been allowed some degree of control over suits arising out of contracts made within their own boundaries even if those contracts involved parties located elsewhere. He further argued that while it is true no State can exercise any authority beyond its own limits which might interfere with rights secured by treaties or laws enacted by Congress; yet he believed this did not extend so far as preventing one State from exercising judicial powers over persons who are actually present within its territory and subjecting them to judgments rendered according thereto upon causes originating elsewhere but affecting property situated therein