In the case of Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that judicial elections are subject to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The dispute arose when a group of African-American lawyers and voters challenged an at-large election system for judges in Harris County, Texas on grounds that it diluted minority voting strength and violated VRA. The state argued that VRA did not apply to judicial elections because judges were not representatives as defined by the law. However, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the court held that nothing in either text or history exempted judicial elections from coverage under Section 2's general prohibition against electoral practices diluting minority voting power.

In the dissenting opinion for Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's decision to apply Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to judicial elections was incorrect. He contended that this interpretation went beyond what Congress intended when it enacted and amended VRA. According to him, applying VRA in this manner could lead to a situation where judges are seen as representatives who should reflect demographic composition rather than impartial arbiters of law. This view undermines the traditional understanding of judicial role and threatens public confidence in judiciary’s independence and impartiality. Furthermore, he expressed concern about potential constitutional issues raised by such an application of VRA.