In the case of David Hunt and Others vs. Robert Wickliffe, appellants argued that a deed from Wickliffe to them was invalid because it had not been properly acknowledged before a justice of the peace as required by law. The lower court ruled in favor of Wickliffe, finding that he had acted in good faith when executing the deed and thus should be allowed to retain his property rights despite any technical deficiencies with its execution. Appellants appealed this decision on grounds that they were entitled to possession of the land regardless due to their reliance on what they believed was a validly executed instrument. However, upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling; noting that while there may have been some irregularities with respect to how it was executed, such did not render it void or otherwise impair its validity since all parties involved acted without fraud or deceit and relied upon each other's representations in good faith.

In the dissenting opinion of David Hunt and Others, Appellants vs. Robert Wickliffe, Appellee, Chief Justice Marshall argued that a judgment should not be reversed unless it is clear that an error was made in the lower court’s decision. He believed that there were no errors in this case and thus the original judgement should stand. The appellants had claimed they were entitled to certain lands under a Virginia statute which granted them title if their ancestor had been living on or cultivating those lands before 1779. However, Chief Justice Marshall found that since these lands were located within Kentucky at the time of passage of said statute (1779), they could not have been included as part of its terms because Kentucky did not become part of Virginia until 1792 when it became known as “Kentucky County” within Virginia's borders. Therefore he concluded that even though appellants may have met all other requirements for obtaining title to these particular tracts of land under said statute; due to their location outside Virginia at time stated by law they could not receive such titles from state government and therefore upheld appellee’s claim over them instead