The U.S. Supreme Court case Hurley, Secretary of War v. Kincaid in 1931 revolved around a dispute over the ownership and control of land adjacent to military reservations. The government had leased this land to private individuals for agricultural purposes under an act passed by Congress in 1916, which allowed such leases as long as they did not interfere with military use or public defense needs. However, when the lease expired, one lessee (Kincaid) refused to vacate the premises claiming that he held a valid homestead entry on it from before its reservation for military uses. The court ruled against Kincaid stating that once lands are reserved for specific public uses like national defense by competent authority (in this case Congress), no private rights can attach until those lands have been officially disposed off or abandoned by said authority. Therefore, even though Kincaid's claim might have been valid prior to the reservation of these lands for military use; after their reservation his claim was rendered null and void unless recognized specifically by Congress itself.

In the dissenting opinion for Hurley v. Kincaid, Justice Stone argued that Congress had not intended to give the Secretary of War unlimited discretion in determining whether a river was navigable and therefore subject to federal control. He believed that such an interpretation would lead to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Instead, he suggested that Congress meant only to authorize the Secretary's determination as final on questions of fact but not law - meaning it could be reviewed by courts if challenged. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s view about what constituted “navigability,” arguing instead for a broader definition which included rivers used or capable of being used for transport in interstate commerce regardless of their natural state or improvements made upon them.